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Noninvasive Brain Stimulation and
Personal Identity: Ethical
Considerations
Jonathan Iwry 1*, David B. Yaden 1* and Andrew B. Newberg 2
1Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, United States, 2Myrna Brind Center for Integrative
Medicine, Thomas Jefferson University, Philadelphia, PA, United States
As noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) technology advances, these methods may
become increasingly capable of influencing complex networks of mental functioning. We
suggest that these might include cognitive and affective processes underlying personality
and belief systems, which would raise important questions concerning personal identity
and autonomy. We give particular attention to the relationship between personal identity
and belief, emphasizing the importance of respecting users’ personal values. We posit
that research participants and patients should be encouraged to take an active approach
to considering the personal implications of altering their own cognition, particularly in
cases of neurocognitive “enhancement.” We suggest that efforts to encourage careful
consideration through the informed consent process would contribute usefully to studies
and treatments that use NIBS.
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INTRODUCTION
Noninvasive brain stimulation (NIBS) increasingly enables researchers and clinicians to safely
and effectively alter brain function. Whether used for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of
neurocognitive “enhancement,” these and other forms of neurological technology are the subject
of considerable scrutiny. Their scope and relative novelty raise possibilities for improved cognition
and general well-being, but also a host of concerns, typically involving questions of justice, fairness,
and, for some, threats to certain cultural norms or values (Farah et al., 2004; Sandel, 2009).
Among these concerns is the potential impact of NIBS and related technologies on personal
identity. Could lower-level cognitive alterations have unexpected effects on higher-level aspects of
cognition? If so, the use of NIBS, while medically safe, might pose ethical challenges regarding
freedom of personal belief—or, more broadly, what is sometimes called “cognitive liberty”
(Sententia, 2004).
This article examines the potential effects of NIBS on personal identity and their implications
for prospective users. We argue that NIBS might be capable of influencing cognitive processes,
and perhaps even personally meaningful belief systems, in ways that could affect patients’
pursuit of well-being and attitudes toward their own identities. Given this possibility, it is worth
considering how to encourage users of NIBS to adequately address its personal implications,
whether in therapeutic or enhancement settings. We suggest that measures to encourage active
self-determination could promote responsible use of NIBS and contribute to its potential as an
instrument of medical and psychiatric welfare.
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POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS AND SAFETY
OF NIBS
“NIBS” refers to technologies that affect neural activity without
physical penetration. The two main forms of NIBS currently
in use are trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and trans-
cranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). TMS uses a magnetic
field to create neuronal action potentials inside the brain,
sometimes using repeated pulses to create a longer-term effect
(rTMS) (Maeda and Pascual-Leone, 2003). tDCS affects the
polarity of neurons’ resting membrane potential in targeted
regions (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000).
The efficacy of NIBS techniques is being tested for a range of
applications. Promising results with treating depression (George
et al., 2010) have led the U.S. Food & Drug Administration
to license its use as an antidepressant therapy, with other
therapeutic applications in the approval pipeline. Some studies
indicate a potential for treating symptoms of Parkinson’s disease
(Fregni et al., 2005a; Boggio et al., 2006) and restoring speech and
motor control to stroke victims (Webster et al., 2006; Blesneag
et al., 2015; Wessel et al., 2015).
The potential benefits of NIBS extend even beyond therapy
for specific disorders. Studies have explored the capacity for
NIBS to improve visual and spatial processing (Hilgetag et al.,
2001). Results have been especially promising for attempts to
enhance working memory and learning speed with respect to
motor and language tasks (Kim et al., 2004; Fregni et al., 2005b;
Flöel et al., 2008; De Vries et al., 2010). Some researchers
have speculated that these technologies will soon offer a form
of enhancement or “neurocosmetics” that can improve general
cognition, susceptibility to positive emotion, and even artistic
ability among those who are already healthy (Hamilton et al.,
2011).
The most commonly reported risks of NIBS are relatively
minor, though it is possible that side effects have been under-
reported (Brunoni et al., 2011). Headaches and local pain are
the most common effects of TMS, with meta-analyses reporting
rates between 28 and 40% (Machii et al., 2006; Loo et al., 2008).
Other patients report various forms of discomfort from being
immobilized for long periods of time, and even nausea in some
cases (Satow et al., 2002; Machii et al., 2006). Machinery used
in TMS is loud enough to affect hearing temporarily and even,
in one case, permanently (Loo et al., 2001; Zangen et al., 2005)
resulting in the widespread use of earplugs. Minor burns to the
scalp and twitches from stimulated scalp muscles have also been
reported (Roth et al., 1992; O’Reardon et al., 2007; Rossi et al.,
2009).
Psychiatric risks also exist, though they appear to be very
rare. There have been occasional reports of mania during rTMS
treatment of the left PFC for depression and bipolar disorder
(Garcia-Toro, 1999; Dolberg et al., 2001; Xia et al., 2008), as
well as reports of delusions and psychotic symptoms (Ella et al.,
2002; Janicak et al., 2008). It is unclear whether those symptoms
occurred more frequently than average for the illnesses being
treated (Rossi et al., 2009). There is also a risk of seizures, though
they have also been rare; seizures associated with TMS and rTMS,
for instance, date largely to the period before safety guidelines
were established for its use, and of those that have occurred
since 1998, most have involved subjects onmedications with pro-
epileptogenic effects (Rossi et al., 2009). One highly vulnerable
pediatric patient reportedly experienced a seizure during tDCS
(Ekiki, 2015).
CONCERNS REGARDING NIBS AND ITS
POPULAR APPEAL
Some have suggested that the use of NIBS, particularly for
enhancement, calls for greater caution. This would include
more careful evaluation of the use of NIBS on children, given
the higher stakes and uncertain future effects for brains still
undergoing rapid and formative development (Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2012). In addition, Davis and van Koningsbruggen (2013)
point out that “noninvasive” is something of a misnomer,
since electrical currents are directed into the brain with the
purpose of affecting cortical functioning. Any direct interference
with neural activity, even beneficial, might be described more
accurately as “minimally invasive” (Fitz and Reiner, 2015). Of
course, the fact that NIBS is not distressing during treatment
does not mean it cannot have distressing implications for the
patient, and the fact that it does not break the skin does not
mean, figuratively speaking, that it cannot cross other important
personal boundaries.
Despite researchers’ discussion of and explicit warnings
against unsupervised use of NIBS (Wurzman et al., 2016), brain
stimulation products are already commercially available, and
online websites offer instructions for building do-it-yourself
devices. Without proper guidance or information, NIBS could be
conducted recklessly or even in conjunction with other means
of cognitive alteration, with unknown and potentially harmful
effects.
Such issues have already been raised in the
psychopharmacological realm. Surveys suggest that many
college students use Ritalin and other “study drugs” without
prescriptions, hoping to improve their attention and memory
even without having been diagnosed with a disorder (Smith
and Farah, 2011; Farah, 2015b). That such medications are
easily accessible and fairly widespread across college campuses
might encourage students to experiment with those medications
without considering the risks and unknowns of reckless use
(or, if communal pressure is strong enough, in spite of them).
Neuromodulation acts on different mechanisms, and thus comes
with different unknowns, than those of psychopharmacology.
Yet the rise in study-drug abuse would seem to offer a warning
that public excitement about enhancement might impede careful
and reflective decision-making, especially when trying to boost
cognitive functions that are already at healthy levels or when
applying treatments in conditions in which they have not been
demonstrated to be effective.
In some respects, NIBSmight be evenmore prone to deceptive
advertisement. That this class of technologies is advertised as
“noninvasive” may encourage unchecked enthusiasm about its
applications. As an “external” rather than “internal” form of
stimulation (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012), NIBS might lack much
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of the public stigma associated with psychoactive substances,
leading some users to assume without justification that its effects
are not as strong.
The use of any sort of cognitive enhancement without proper
consideration of the personal and environmental context of
its use could lead users to undermine their own attempts to
improve cognition or general well-being. On one hand, the public
appears interested in questions about cognitive enhancement
and sensitive to crucial considerations (Fitz et al., 2014; Schelle
et al., 2014), but the potential for laypeople to be deceived
by fallacious appeals to neuroscience (Weisberg et al., 2008;
Wurzman et al., 2017) raises concerns about their ability to
relate scientific findings and explanations to moral questions in
both public and private life. Patients might not be appropriately
skeptical of unwarranted or exaggerated marketing statements;
even in medical environments, they might underestimate the
relevance of certain personal considerations to their decisions
about treatment.
NIBS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
The convenience and relative safety of NIBS make it
uniquely appealing. However, like deep brain stimulation
and psychopharmacological intervention, NIBS manipulates
neurobiological and cognitive processes (Yaden et al., 2015).
The various treatments differ significantly in their methods of
intervention, yet all three seek to influence mental functioning
through measures over which the patient lacks direct control,
raising concerns for patients who value certain aspects of their
personal identity. This has already been acknowledged with
regard to deep brain stimulation (Schermer, 2011; Maslen et al.,
2015) and psychopharmacology (Elliott, 2004; Kramer, 2004),
and, as discussed below, also merits consideration in the case of
NIBS.
Because of its potential to influence emotion, attention,
reasoning, and social behavior (Hamilton et al., 2011), NIBS has
implications for personal identity that are no less serious than
those of any other method that modulates cognitive processes.
Our view of our emotional and behavioral attributes is a major
part of how we understand and relate to ourselves. Individuals
who suffer from attention and behavior disorders, for example,
often struggle to reconcile their intrusive thoughts and emotions
with their own conceptions of their personalities, and they
are attuned to the effects of psychopharmacological changes
in temperament on their relationships with others (Bolt and
Schermer, 2009; Maslen et al., 2015). These issues are a basic part
of the individual’s decision to turn to medication for treatment,
and they are no less present when deciding whether to use
neuromodulation instead.
There is also the problem of unintended consequences.
Attempts at enhancement may be limited by underlying
neurocognitive constraints, meaning that boosting certain traits
or abilities might come with tradeoffs for others (Iuculano and
Cohen Kadosh, 2013). Effects of identical types of stimulation
on cognitive performance can also vary significantly between
individuals (Sarkar et al., 2014). Because cognitive processes span
vast networks of brain regions (Kato et al., 2009), and because
much remains to be understood about the processes affected by
NIBS (Rajapakse and Kirton, 2013), targeting brain structures to
alter cognition could yield unwanted side effects, mitigate the
desired outcome, or even result in paradoxical responses. (It is
worth clarifying that the issue of unintended consequences is not
unique to NIBS. Indeed, the more spatially localized methods of
intervention used in neuromodulation may lack the more diffuse
effects of pharmacological agents. We do note, however, that off-
target stimulation is a concern when using NIBS; Davis et al.,
2013).
Belief and Identity
Is it possible for lower-level cognitive alterations to have
pervasive effects on much higher-level processes, such as those
involving belief? Of particular interest here are beliefs (or similar
states) concerning the individual’s “deep values” (Veatch, 1995).
These are attitudes, beliefs, and commitments of particular
importance to the individual that relate to central aspects of their
worldview and their conception of their identity. These might
include social attitudes, moral beliefs, religious, and political
inclinations—beliefs that govern daily behavior and givemeaning
to our pursuits and experiences.
The apparent influence of automatic processes on belief
and complex states of reflection is a topic of interest to
cognitive scientists and philosophers. Some have called for
an expanded topography of mental states related to belief,
arguing that the nature and role of belief, even in its common
conception as a mental description of a state of affairs, would
be better understood within a broader context of experience
and behavior (Schwitzgebel, 2001; Gendler, 2008). Much of this
research emphasizes that belief operates on physical systems,
the components of which have yet to be clearly understood and
seem to overlap in diverse ways (Damasio, 1999). These may
include close linkages between perception and emotional and
sensory imagination (Araujo et al., 2013). Reactions to intense
or threatening stimuli often appear to qualify as something akin
to belief and trigger rapid emotional and behavioral responses
(Rudrauf et al., 2008).
Automatic processes interact and even conflict with beliefs
and deliberate reasoning in bringing about behavior. For
example, it has been shown that many judgments rely more
on automatic processes than conscious reflection (Kahneman,
2011). Many of our attitudes toward moral decisions, even when
formalized as clear-cut propositions, can shift in response to
differences in presentation (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Taber
and Lodge, 2006). Considerable research has been devoted to the
relationship between and apparent influence of disgust and other
forms of emotional processing on political ideology (Amodio
et al., 2007; Ahn et al., 2014; Hibbing et al., 2014). Moral
intuitionists argue that moral reasoning is almost completely
governed by these processes, and that beliefs and reasons arise
only afterwards to support intuitive reactions (Wegner and
Bargh, 1998; Haidt, 2012).
Many promising findings for NIBS involve alterations to
complex cognitive processes involving attention, memory, and
judgment that could subtly influence patients’ beliefs. Affecting
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the mechanisms of belief, however indirectly, without patients’
awareness or ability to mediate the effects could impinge on
their values. NIBS has already demonstrated the potential to
temporarily shift political orientation by increasing activity in the
DLPFC (Chawke and Kanai, 2015), which is closely implicated in
regulation of political attitudes (Kato et al., 2009).
These interactions between automatic processes and belief
might also influence the ways that patients interpret personally
meaningful experiences. Research on religious and spiritual
states appears to point in this direction (Newberg et al.,
2001, 2003; Urgesi et al., 2010; Yaden et al., 2017a,b; also
see Yaden et al., 2016). Crescentini et al. (2014) were able
to alter participants’ degrees of implicit spiritual or non-
spiritual identification using NIBS. For many, these temporary
changes might be more akin to changes of perspective than
literal changes in belief, but their effects on behavior and
personal outlook suggest that they can play a significant role
in patients’ worldviews and influence deeply held beliefs and
values.
Challenges to Autonomy
The risk that NIBS might affect central aspects of a patient’s
identity, including their values and belief system, raises additional
concerns about their ability to preserve their “mental self-
determination” (Bublitz and Merkel, 2014). If an individual
holds a conception of organic personal continuity that gives
coherence to their sense of self, then undergoing any kind
of intervention with uncertain consequences for their thought
processes could threaten that notion of integrity. Having
undergone neuromodulation, they might come to worry that
they have surrendered their autonomy over certain personally
significant or defining mental characteristics (that they might
have, as it were, estranged themselves from themselves). In
addition to the risk of psychological distress, this could pose a
challenge for practitioners who are concerned about how best to
respect their patients’ values.
AUTONOMY AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE
Although unforeseen alterations to personal identity raise
important questions for those considering NIBS, these become
less troubling if users can evaluate and resolve them for
themselves while deciding whether to undergo treatment. It
would generally be of benefit to patients—and consistent with
general medical practices—to emphasize individual freedom of
decision-making. Recognizing the risk that users would too often
pursue treatment without considering the implications for their
identity, we might look for relatively unobtrusive ways of helping
to make a more informed decision.
In strengthening autonomy of the patient in deciding
whether to use NIBS, we might decide to prioritize active self-
determination over less rigorous exercise of personal freedom.
Much has been written about what counts as a legitimate
autonomous judgment (Farah, 2015a); one appealing position by
Savulescu (1994) is that a desire is “rationally autonomous” when
it reflects judgments that are adequately informed, well-reasoned,
and based on a realistic imagination of the results of acting on
that desire. When individuals appear to make decisions bearing
considerable risk, out of either inattentiveness or impatience, we
often consider it wise to encourage them to pause and reflect
rationally on their situations.
If there is indeed a risk that patients will be unprepared
for the personal implications of NIBS, this adds an additional
mental health aspect to their decisional calculus. It may then be
in patients’ interest for practitioners to help them consider the
implications for their notion of selfhood and, if they choose the
treatment, prepare to interpret those implications in a way that
is both mentally healthy and consistent with their broader set of
personal values.
POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR INFORMED
CONSENT
Due to the potential for bias and situation to unduly influence
judgment, and due to the conceptual difficulties inherent in
reflecting on possible implications for personal identity, added
measures associated with choice architecture and the informed
consent process might benefit participants and patients in
exercising their autonomy in deciding whether to use NIBS.
These would allow the informed consent process to serve as a
sort of checkpoint for the patient, giving them the resources to
make sure that they are well-informed. The goal, in a sense,
would be to encourage them to go beyond mere “consent” and
take an active stance toward considering critical aspects of their
well-being (Veatch, 1995).
Informed consent documents serve partly to protect medical
institutions against liability, but also are intended to protect the
well-being of the patient. Arguably, documents addressing the
practical hazards of NIBS already do a considerable amount to
serve that second goal, though perhaps even more could be done
to address less tangible but no less consequential concerns for
the patient’s long-term ability to flourish. Adding an “identity
and values” disclosure, for instance, would ensure that the patient
has explicitly considered implications for their identity and other,
more abstract, yet equally significant personal concerns.
Although informed consent waivers are already a necessary
part of the process, they might not be sufficient. Given that
individuals often fail to read or meaningfully absorb the content
of these waivers, users would almost certainly benefit from
an opportunity to discuss personal concerns and ask detailed
questions in private conversation with psychiatrists and medical
experts (Flory and Emanuel, 2004). To that end, some sort
of counseling might be offered in advance of treatment to
ensure that patients have reflected on any related issues of
serious importance to them and can incorporate those concerns
into their decisions over NIBS treatment. It is increasingly
common for clinicians to employ some form of what some call
“shared decision-making,” an approach to informed consent that
recognizes that individuals often benefit from actively discussing
options with clinicians, and that doing so improves the quality
of their decisions while respecting their general autonomy (King
and Moulton, 2006; Elwyn et al., 2012). This approach might
usefully be applied to the informed consent process for NIBS, as
well. Prospective users of NIBS would be better served in making
decisions that reflect their long-term interests if they could
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explore the personal implications of neuromodulation in a setting
that emphasized careful and explicit communication, open
expression and shared evaluation of the patient’s preferences,
and strong patient-clinician rapport. Of course, additional
complexities and the need for more stringent requirements in the
consent/assent process must be considered in cases of NIBS use
on children (Davis, 2014; Maslen et al., 2014).
Although the so-called “therapy-enhancement distinction”
(Farah, 2015a) can sometimes be ambiguous (Earp et al.,
2014), perhaps the potential impact on personal identity should
be weighed more heavily when treatment is intended for
enhancement rather than therapy. Patients seeking to treat
Parkinson’s or depression might be less concerned about
comparatively subtle effects on their identities, let alone abstract
notions of personal autonomy. However, a healthy individual
usingNIBS simply for purposes of enhancement—say, improving
their memory—could be taking a risk that is harder to justify.
Accordingly, additional counseling might be required, or at least
encouraged, for treatments intended to make the patient “better
than well” (Elliott and Chambers, 2004).
CONCLUSION
The applications of brain stimulation methods labeled
“noninvasive” might well-continue to expand in the future.
Given that certain aspects of personal identity, or the freedom
to decide one’s own identity, might someday fall within the
reach of such methods, we would be well-served by taking a
conservative approach to cognitive alteration while seeking to
protect cognitive features traditionally considered to be valuable
components of personhood. In the meantime, the process of
deciding whether to use NIBS could be structured to more
effectively emphasize nonmedical considerations and encourage
rational autonomy. Informed consent documents could, for
example, acknowledge a range of potential personal implications
of undergoing NIBS. Counseling could also be offered to expose
participants and patients to useful information and to encourage
careful consideration of their interests and options. Respect
for individuals’ personal autonomy and values constitutes
an important aspect of many therapeutic, enhancement, and
research procedures–NIBS, while “noninvasive,” ought to be
included among them. Improvements to informed consent
might not settle the fundamental debates concerning the ethics
of personal identity, but they might well-complement those
debates and prove to be a step in the right direction.
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